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Abstract
This article discusses how Indonesian state manages its religious diversity.
The state policies on religious diversity cannot be understood without
analyzing the history of  how the founding fathers decided to choose
Indonesia as neither secular nor Islamic country, but somewhere between
the two. The author discusses three topics, namely the recognized religions,
Muslim fear of Christianization, and dialogue and inter-religious harmony.
Based on the Decree No.1/1965, Confucianism was one of  six religions
recognized by the state. However, in the Soeharto era, around 1979, this
religion was dropped from the list, and only after his fall Confucianism
has been rehabilitated, and even the Chinese New Year has been included
as one of the national holidays in Indonesia. In terms of Muslim-Christian
relations, there were tensions since 1960s, particularly dealt with the issue
of the high number of Muslims who converted to Christianity. It was in
this situation that in 1967 a newly built Methodist Church in Meulaboh,
Aceh, was closed by Muslims, arguing that the Church was a concrete
example of  the aggressiveness of  Christian missions because it was built
in a Muslim majority area. Since the Meulaboh case, the Muslims
consistently insisted the government to accommodate their four demands:
(1) restriction on establishing new places of worship; (2) restriction on
–––––––––––––––––
* The first version of this article was presented at the International Seminar on
Cultural Diversity and Social Equity in Indonesia and Canada”, organized by the State
Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, 10 December 2007.
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religious propagation, and control of foreign aid for religious institutions;
(4) Islamic religion classes should be given to Muslim students studying in
Christian schools; (5) inter-religious marriage should not be allowed. Apart
from these contested issues, the government and religious leaders have been
trying to avoid conflict and to establish cooperation and peace among religious
groups in the country through inter-religious dialogues, either organized by
the government or sponsored by the leaders of  religious groups themselves.
The author argues that specific socio-political contexts should be taken
into consideration to understand state policies making concerning religious
diversity. Hence, all debates and compromises achieved afterwards usually
do not go beyond the neither secular nor Islamic compromise.
Keywords: state policy, religious diversity, religious conflict, pluralism.
A. Introduction
Indonesia “is not just locally, accidentally and temporarily
pluralist. It is, to commit a philosophical solecism and a political truth,
pervasively, essentially, and permanently so,” said the American
Indonesianist, Clifford Geertz.1 Anyone who knows Indonesia would
probably agree with Geertz’s remarks. Indonesia is a multi-ethnic society
with more than 1,000 ethnic/sub-ethnic groups living in various
separated islands. The difference among the ethnic groups is mostly
cultural, but it can sometimes be seen in physical appearances too.
This country is also politically quite diverse, and it is well indicated by
the present multiparty system.
Indonesia is religiously plural as well. It is true that Indonesia is
home to the largest Muslim population in the world. The government
statistics of 2000 indicates that 88.22% of the Indonesians are Muslim.
However, there are different types Muslim organizations in Indonesia
(reformist, traditionalist, moderate, radical etc.), and there are also
nominal Muslims who do not regularly practice Islam. Moreover,
Christians are the largest religious minority in the country, comprising
8.22% of the total population followed by Hindus (1.81%) and
–––––––––––––––––
1 Clifford Geertz, “The Near East in the Far East: On Islam in Indonesia”
(Occasional Paper of  the School of  Social Science, 2001), p. 11.
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Buddhists (0.84%). It is very important to note that in certain areas,
Christianity is the religion of  majority or a large minority, namely in
East Nusatenggara (87.67%), Papua (75.51%), North Sulawesi,
excluding Gorontalo, (69.27%), Maluku, excluding North Maluku
(50.19 %), North Sumatra (31.40%) and West Kalimantan (34.01%).
It is also well known that Hinduism is the religion of majority in Bali,
comprising 87.44% of its population.2
Faced with the problem of  diversity, the founding fathers of  the
Indonesian state were urged to answer this very important question:
What is the thing that can unite the diversity? In response to this
question, history tells us that the founding fathers were divided into
two groups: one opted for secular nationalism and another for Islam.
After a series of debates and negotiations, they eventually made a
compromise that the Indonesian state should be neither secular nor
Islamic, but somewhere between the two!
The unclear position is indicated by the first principle of the
state ideology, Pancasila, namely ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’. The
meaning of the sentence is not clear but it somehow reflects the
compromise. The Islamic oriented groups usually takes the phrase “Yang
Maha Esa”, literally means “the One”, to argue that it refers to the
Muslim belief in monotheism (tawhîd), while the secular oriented groups
often emphasize the word “Ketuhanan” which means “Godhead” as
contrasted to the word “Tuhan” (God) to argue that it refers to all
religions and beliefs, not exclusively to Islam.
The compromise is also found in Article 29 of 1945 Constitution
concerning religion. Section 1 and 2 of the Article is the following: (1)
The state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa; (2) The state guarantees
the freedom of  each citizen to embrace his/her religion and to observe the rituals
according to his/her religion and belief. One can argue for religious freedom
by referring to the section 2 of the Article. However, for those who
want to argue for the state intervention in religious matters, they can
also refer to the section 1. It is important to note that the attempts to
–––––––––––––––––
2 See Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, Indonesia’s Population:
Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 104; 115-16.
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amend the Article have been unsuccessful.3
In January 1946, just several months after the proclamation of
Indonesian Independence, the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sutan Sjahrir,
decided to establish the Department of  Religious Affairs.4 This
Department apparently embodies the compromise that Indonesian state
is neither secular nor Islamic. The existence of the Department clearly
indicates that the state intervenes in religious (but not exclusively
Islamic) matters. It is true that the Department mostly serves the Muslim
interests, but there are also a few positions for other religions, especially
the so called “recognized religions”. In the early years of  Soeharto’s
New Order, there were voices demanding the abolition of the
Department, but the President finally decided to keep it. Now, the
Department still exists and probably would not be abolished in the
(near) future.
The state policies on religious diversity in Indonesia cannot be
understood without considering the facts above. Specific socio-political
contexts certainly play a part in the making of state policies, but all
debates and compromises achieved afterwards usually do not go beyond
the neither secular nor Islamic compromise. It is true that in certain
cases, the state tended to be more secular, while in other cases it tended
to be more Islamic, but it never became totally Islamic or secular
oriented.
B. The Recognized Religions
As discussed above, the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa does not
exclusively refer to Islam, but it somehow indicates that the Indonesian
state should be religious. Does it mean that all citizens should believe
in a religion? Should the state determine certain religions as recognized
religions? During the two decades after the independence, it seems
that there were no positive answers to these questions. It was partly
–––––––––––––––––
3 See “Perubahan Keempat UUD 1945 Disahkan”, Kompas, 11 Agustus 2002.
4 On the Department of Religious Affairs, see C.A.O van Nieuwenhuijze,
Aspects of  Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), pp. 236-
43; Deliar Noer, The Administration of Islam in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia
Project, 1978), p. 12 ff; and B.J. Boland, The Struggle of  Islam in Modern Indonesia (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 108-9.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008 M/1429 H 105
State Policies on Religious Diversity in Indonesia
because after the revolutionary war (1945-1949), and then the elections
of  1955, the political forces still struggled for their respective
ideological orientations. From 1959 to 1965, the Indonesian first
President, Soekarno, introduced “Guided Democracy” with a
“synthetic” ideology combining the three competing ideologies called
“Nasakom”, an acronym of Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism,
Islam and Communism).5 In this period, we find that the Department
of Religious Affairs was not abolished, but at the same time, the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) became increasingly strong.
In early 1960s, however, the political contest between the PKI
and its enemies, especially the army and the Islamic groups became
more critical. Partly as a response to PKI’s agitation against Islam, the
Minister of Religious Affairs, Saifuddin Zuhri, successfully demanded
President Soekarno to issue the Decree No.1/1965 on “the Prevention
of Misuse and/or Abuse of Religion”. The Decree states, among other
things, that “the acceptance of  the first principle (Ketuhanan Yang Maha
Esa) cannot be separated from religion, because it is one of the main
pillars of human life and Indonesian nation, and it is also the backbone
of  the state life and the necessary element of  the nation building.”6
Then, in the Elucidation of Article 1 of the Decree, we find the
following sentences:
Religions embraced by Indonesian citizens = Islam, Protestantism,
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. This can be
proved by the historical development of religions in Indonesia. Because
these six religions are embraced by almost all Indonesian citizens, apart
from the guarantee mentioned in the Article 29 section 2 of the
Constitution, they also receive aid and protection as dictated by this
article.
It does not mean that other religions, for instance Judaism,
Zoroastrianism, Shinto, Taoism, are banned in Indonesia. They get full
guarantee given by the Article 29 section 2 of the Constitution, so they
–––––––––––––––––
5 Soekarno already proposed this idea in his article published in 1926, and it is
translated into English in 1970. See Soekarno Nationalism, Islam and Communism Trans.
Karel H. Warouw dan Peter D. Weldon (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).
6 Weinata Sairin, Himpunan Peraturan di Bidang Keagamaan (Jakarta: BPK, 1994),
p. 265.
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shall be allowed to exist as long as they do not contradict this regulation
or other regulations.
For the spiritual bodies/groups (badan/aliran kebatinan), the government
tries to lead them to a healthy vision and Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa
direction. 7
The Elucidation of the Decree quoted above indicates that there
are six religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism,
Buddhism and Confucianism) followed by Indonesians, and those
religions would receive both protection and aid from the state. In other
words, they are “the recognized religions”. The Decree also states that
other religions are also allowed to exist and shall get protection (but
apparently not aid), from the state, unless they break the law. The
Decree, however, does not approve spiritual bodies/groups as
distinctive religions, and therefore, the state shall try to guide them to
“a healthy vision” and “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” direction (whatever
these terms mean). The spiritual bodies/groups here probably refer to
Javanese Mystical groups, tribal religions or other religious groups
considered heterodox by the Islamic mainstream.
After the abortive coup of 1965 followed by the massacre of
the communists and suspects, the time had come for the army to
establish the New Order regime. This regime identified communism,
or more precisely the PKI, as the common enemy of the state. The
regime argued that communist ideology is equal to atheism and anti-
religion, and therefore, it is opposed to the first principle of Pancasila,
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. Consequently, everybody had to affiliate
herself with one of the recognized religions or otherwise she could be
charged with being a communist. This policy certainly strengthened
the position of  the recognized religions.
During the New Order period, however, the position of the
recognized religions was not unchallenged. The challenge primarily
came from the Javanese mystical groups. President Soeharto had
sympathetic relations with them, and he apparently realized their
political significance to counterbalance the Islamic groups. Since 1950s
the Javanese mystical groups had actually demanded the government
–––––––––––––––––
7 Sairin, Himpunan, pp. 266-7. My translation.
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to include them as one of the recognized religions, but the attempts
never succeeded. In fact, in 1978 the government party, Golkar,
proposed the same idea to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR),
but it also failed, primarily because of the strong opposition from the
Islamic groups.
The followers of the Javanese mysticism, therefore, have been
dictated to affiliate formally with one of  the recognized religions. The
same policy affects the followers of local/tribal religions like the Karo
people who believe in the so called Perbagu religion, and the Ngaju
Dayak who believe in Kaharingan religion. These native religions have
been simply categorized as Hindu variants by the government. Presently,
there are voices demanding state recognition of the tribal religions,
but so far there is no sign that the government shall take a positive
response.
Like the Javanese Mysticism and local religions, the recent
controversy on “new religions” or “sects” is also a challenge to the
state policy on recognized religions.8 Does the state have the authority
to judge one’s beliefs? Should the state follow the dominant opinion
among religious leaders, to judge the validity of certain beliefs and
practices of the new sects? Should the state guide the followers of the
new sects to embrace one of the recognized religions, or even to the
religious teachings followed by the majority of a recognized religion?
It is also noteworthy that during the Soeharto period, around
1979, Confucianism was dropped from the list of the recognized
religions. The government assimilation policy for the Indonesian Chinese
was apparently the reason behind the dropping. After the fall of
Soeharto, however, the position of  Confucianism as a recognized
religion has been rehabilitated. The Chinese New Year (called “Imlek”
in Indonesia), has been included as one of  the national holidays.
–––––––––––––––––
8 New religious groups like al-Qiya>dah, Sala>mulla>h, Jemaah Qur’an Suci etc.
have recently attracted public attention in Indonesia. The Indonesian Ulama Council
(MUI) issued fatwas that the groups are heretical, and the government authorities have
sentenced their leaders.  On these new religious groups, see Tempo (11 November 2007).
For a study of similar groups during the New Order period, see Martin van Bruinessen,
“Gerakan Sempalan di Kalangan Umat Islam Indonesia: Latar Belakang Sosial Budaya”
Ulumul Qur’an Vol. 3 No. 1 (1992), pp. 16-27.
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C. State Policies and Muslim Fear of Christianization
Muslim-Christian conflicts in Indonesia have become a more
serious issue since the New Order period.9 As noted above, communism
identified with atheism and anti-religion, was the very enemy of the
New Order regime. Thus, to save oneself from the accusation of being
a communist, he or she should affiliate formally with one of  the
recognized religions.  As a result, a high number of  conversions to the
state recognized religions occurred in the early years of  the New Order.
The new converts were mostly nominal Muslims called ‘abangan’ among
the Javanese (the largest ethnic group comprising more than 40% of
the total population), and the followers of  tribal religions.10
Although many people also converted to Islam, the high number
of conversion to Christianity made the Muslim leaders worried. One
of  the reasons was the provocative news in Western media boasting
about ‘mass conversion’ to Christianity and about a huge amount of
money sent to Indonesia for missionary activities. Among the Indonesian
Christians themselves, there was also optimism that in a short period
all Indonesia would be followers of  Jesus. Not least significant, some
missionaries, particularly those of the evangelical background, preached
the Bible through door-to-door visits. For many Muslims, this was too
aggressive.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Islamic groups
were politically frustrated. The ruling army, in alliance with the secular
oriented Muslims and the Christians, were opposed to the attempts of
the Islamic groups to include explicitly the state responsibility to apply
the shari’a in the Constitution. In addition, although the reformist
Muslim group was initially an important ally for the army during the
crushing of  the PKI and the Soekarno regime, the army finally did not
–––––––––––––––––
9 For a detailed account, see Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian
Relations in Indonesia’s New Order (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press/ISIM, 2006),
Chapter 1.
10 For a comparative analysis of conversion of two ethnic groups in this period,
see Mujiburrahman, “Religious Conversion in Indonesia: the Karo Batak and the
Tengger Javanese” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations Vol. 12 (January, 2001), pp. 23-
38.
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allow the rehabilitation of  their political party, Masyumi, which was
banned by Soekarno in 1960.
It was in the above socio-political context that in 1967 a newly
built Methodist Church in Meulaboh, Aceh, was closed by Muslims.
The Muslims argued that the Church was a concrete example of the
aggressiveness of  Christian missions because it was built in a Muslim
majority area. As a reaction to this case, the Protestant and Catholic
parties in the Parliament, proposed Questions (interpelasi) to the
government regarding the issue of religious freedom. In return, the
Islamic parties proposed other Questions to the government regarding
control of  foreign aid for religious institutions. They also demanded
the government restrict religious propagation only to those outside the
recognized religions. The government’s responses to the Questions were
generally ambiguous, and at the same time it insisted that the debate
on the issues should be stopped.
Since the Meulaboh case, the Muslims consistently insisted the
government to accommodate their four demands: (1) restriction on
establishing new places of worship; (2) restriction on religious
propagation, and control of foreign aid for religious institutions; (4)
Islamic religion classes should be given to Muslim students studying in
Christian schools; (5) inter-religious marriage should not be allowed.
1. The Restriction on Building New Places of  Worship11
The first Muslim demand accommodated by the government was
the restriction on establishing new places of  worship. In 1969, the
Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs issued
a joint decree in which it was stated, among other things, that to build
a new place of worship one should get an approval of the people living
in the area, including the local religious leaders. Ever since, it has been
very difficult for Christians to erect a church in Muslim majority areas
as for Muslims to build a mosque in non-Muslim majority areas.
During the New Order period, there were cases in which Muslims
attacked several churches on the ground that they were built without
–––––––––––––––––
11 For a detailed account of  issues discussed in section 1 and section 2 below, see
Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, pp. 72-91.
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following the regulation. Similar cases reoccurred after the fall of the
New Order. In October 2004, a group of  Muslims barricaded a Catholic
school in Cileduk, Jakarta, because it was used illegally for religious
services, and for the same reason, 23 churches have been closed by
Muslims in West Java in September 2005. On the other hand, voices
condemning these actions and arguing for religious freedom and
tolerance were also heard among the Christians and some Muslims.
The incident in 2004 and 2005 above eventually pushed the
government to change the 1969 Decree, and after some negotiations,
the government finally issued the Decree No. 8 and 9/2006.12 However,
this new Decree apparently does not go very far from the earlier one.
To get the permission to build a new place of  worship, one has to get
approval from at least 60 people living close to the area. In addition,
one has to prove that there are 90 people who shall use that place.
This regulation clearly prefers the majority to the minority. It is also
more applicable in densely populated cities than in cities and villages
with low population.
On the other hand, it is important to note that according to a
Christian Minister, Daniel Sopamena, there are a few positive things
in the new Decree. First, it dictates that one of the authorized
institutions to give a recommendation for building a new place of
worship is the Inter-religious Harmony Forum (FKUB) in which all
recognized religions are represented. Second, there is a time limit
(namely 90 days) for the government to respond to the application.
Sopamena said that in the past, he used to submit an application, and
there was no response from the government up to 11 years! He hopes
that this new regulation will prevent this kind of treatment to happen.
Third, the new Decree dictates that in case a group of people do not
have a place of  worship, they can apply for a temporary permission to
use an ordinary building. This alternative was not found in the previous
Decree.13
–––––––––––––––––
12 The full text of  the Decree can be found in www.mirifica.net
13 Interview with Daniel Sopamena, Makassar, 20 June 2007.
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2. The Restriction on Religious Propagation and Control of  Foreign Aid
Regarding the control of religious propagation, the government
initially tried to accommodate the Muslim demand in an Inter-religious
Consultation of 1967 (organized by the government) but it was
unsuccessful particularly because of the Christian opposition to this
idea. It was only after a decade later, namely in 1978, that the
government issued a decree restricting religious propagation only to
those outside the recognized religions. By the same year, the
government also issued a decree on the government control of foreign
aid for religious institutions. This accommodation was attempts of  the
government at political reconciliation with the Islamic groups who had
been the staunchest oppositional voice.
On the other hand, the Christians consistently asserted that the
decrees were against religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution,
and therefore, they should be withdrawn. The government never
withdrew the decrees but the protest of the Christians still had some
effects on practice. The government loosely implemented the decrees,
and this made some Muslim leaders disappointed. The government
ambiguity was because its interest lied neither in defending religious
freedom nor in curbing Christian missions but in maintaining political
stability and power.  It is also noteworthy that so far this policy has not
been changed yet, even though it is already three decades old (1978-
2008).
3. Compulsory Religion Classes14
Up to 1965, religion classes at schools and universities were
optional in Indonesia. However, in 1967, in line with the increasing
significance of religion in national politics, especially to oppose
communism as the state common enemy, religion classes have been
compulsory in Indonesia. The religion classes taught at schools and
universities are of  those recognized religions. This is in accordance
with the government policy that one has to affiliate with one of the
recognized religions.
–––––––––––––––––
14 For a detailed account, see Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, Chapter 5.
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In terms of  Muslim-Christian relations, there has been a problem
regarding the issue of  religion classes. Muslim parents preferred to send
their children to study at Christian private schools because the latter
could provide a high quality of  learning and training. As in many other
countries, the Christian schools in Indonesia have been developed since
the colonial period when the Christian missionaries started their mission
in the Archipelago. These schools did not only produce the early
prominent Christian leaders of the new Republic of Indonesia, but
also helped eradicate illiteracy among the natives throughout the
country.
For many of  the Muslims concerned with religious education,
the enrolment of many Muslim students in the Christian schools has
been alarming because the students only received a Christian religion
class. The prominent Muslim leaders said that a Muslim child who
studied at a Christian school would face at least two dangers: the child
might be converted to Christianity or become a skeptical and
uncommitted Muslim. To face this challenge, some Muslim leaders
tried to do at least three things: first, they tried to convince the Muslim
communities that to study in a Christian school was harmful to the
Islamic commitment of children; second, the Muslims tried to establish
and develop better Islamic private schools to compete with the Christian
schools; third, they demanded a state regulation obliging every private
school to provide a religion class according to the religion of the
students.
The last attempt was not easy because while the first and second
aims were only Muslim internal affairs, the third aim had to face
opposition from the Christians and others who shared or sympathized
with the Christian objection. Since late 1960s, some important Muslim
leaders already demanded that religion classes should be taught
according to the religion of the students and the teacher should be of
the same religious background. This idea, however, was only partially
accommodated about two decades later, namely in the Education Law
of 1989. Nevertheless, because of the strong protest of the Christian
leaders, this regulation was finally applied only to state schools not
private schools. Because Christian schools are private, the regulation
was not applied to them. It is understandable, therefore, that some
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Muslim leaders were unhappy with the government policy.
After the fall of the New Order, this issue became a hot
controversy again during the making of the new Education Law of
2003. A lot of articles published in various newspapers and magazines
opposing or supporting the idea of religion classes should be taught by
a teacher to students of the same religious background. In addition to
the Christians, among the opponents, there were also Muslims arguing
that the state should not deny the rights of  a private school, let’s say a
Christian school, to teach only Christianity to its students.15 Apart from
the opposition, the idea was finally accommodated in the new Law
(Article 12, section 1), and we are still observing how it is to be applied.
4. Religious and Inter-religious Marriage16
In early 1970s, the government proposed a marriage bill to the
parliament. The bill soon triggered strong opposition from the Islamic
groups. First of  all, the Department of  Religious Affairs was not
involved in drafting the bill. Second, the bill tended to treat marriage
as a secular rather than a religious issue. Third, there are some articles
of  the bill that contradict Islamic family law. Fourth, Islamic forces
were in a political frustration because the government party, Golkar,
dominated the parliament.
After a series of Muslim demonstrations and protests, the
government, via the Armed Forces (ABRI), successfully made some
compromises with the Muslim leaders. Perhaps, the most important
compromise was the definition of the legal validity of marriage. The
bill merely required that marriage should be registered to the
government, and this was considered too secular by the Muslims.
–––––––––––––––––
15 See for instance the statement of the executive chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama,
Hasyim Muzadi in Suara Pembaruan (17 March 2003). See also the articles written by
younger Muslim intellectuals such as Nur Khalik Ridwan, “Pendidikan Agama, Hak
Asasi dan Ideologi” Suara Pembaruan (8 May 2003); Rumadi, “Pendidikan, Agama dan
Kontroversi RUU Sisdiknas” Kompas (29 March 2003); Zuly Qodir, “Lagi, RUU
Sisdiknas” Kompas (6 June 2003); Ahmad Fuad Fanani, “RUU Sisdiknas: Ada Hegemoni
Negara di Situ?” Kompas (3 May 2003). It is not surprising that these articles were
published in Suara Pembaruan and Kompas, commonly associated with Protestants and
Catholics respectively.
16 For a detailed account, see Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, Chapter 4.
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Therefore, besides the registration, the Muslims demanded that
“Marriage is valid if it is carried out according to the laws of respective
religions and beliefs”, and this definition was ratified by the Parliament.
What are the respective religions and beliefs? They are certainly the
recognized religions! Therefore, marriages outside the recognized
religions cannot be legalized.
Another problem is inter-religious marriage. A few religious
groups allowed inter-religious marriages, while many of them do not
allow or at least do not support that kind of marriage. If a recognized
religion does not allow inter-religious marriage, how then can that
marriage be legalized? The problem becomes more complex because
the clause of the bill allowing inter-religious marriage was finally
dropped. A prominent Muslim leader, M. Rasjidi, wrote at that time
that the clause was an undercover Christianization effort. He believed
that the Christians used inter-marriage to convert young Muslims. A
rumor circulated among Muslims that the bill was drafted by the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the New Order think tank
established by some prominent Catholic activists and intellectuals in
cooperation with Soeharto’s two important generals. Whatever the
political context was, the Marriage Law of 1974 does not have a clear
position on inter-religious marriages. Consequently, inter-religious
marriages are generally difficult, although not impossible, to get legal
approval in Indonesia.
One of the possible ways to help legalize inter-religious marriage
within the present Marriage Law is to assert that it is religiously
acceptable. In the year 2003, the Paramadia Foundation in Jakarta
(founded by the prominent Indonesian Muslim intellectual, Nurcholish
Madjid), organized a public discussion on inter-religious marriage. The
two main speakers in the discussion, Zainun Kamal and Musdah Mulia,
proposed the idea that inter-religious marriage can be accepted if one
develops a new interpretation of Islamic sources in question.17 The
prominent activist of Paramadina, Budhy Munawar Rachman also
explained to the audience that Paramadina already helped several
–––––––––––––––––
17 See Zainun Kamal, “Kawin Antar Umat Beragama” and Musdah Mulia, “Islam
dan Pernikahan Antar Agama” in Penafsiran Islam atas Pernikahan Antar Agama (Jakarta:
Seri KKA Paramadina ke-200, 17 October 2003).
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people to carry out inter-religious marriages. As can be expected, the
discussion was full of debates between the proponents and the
opponents. When the idea reached a wider public, the resistance to it
was even harder. Thus, it seems to me that it would be better (and
perhaps more acceptable) to legalize inter-religious marriages based
on civil rights rather than religion.
D. Dialogue and Inter-religious Harmony18
Apart from the contested issues above, the government and
religious leaders have been trying to avoid conflict and to establish
cooperation and peace among religious groups in the country. There
have been inter-religious dialogues organized by the government or
sponsored by the leaders of  religious groups themselves. It is also not
uncommon that inter-religious conflicts in society helped push both
the government and religious leaders to hold a dialogue.
1. The Government initiatives
As mentioned above, in response to the increasing Muslim
discourses and actions against the Christians, in November 1967 the
government organized the “Inter-religious Consultation” (Musjawarah
Antar Agama). Although the Consultation finally came to a deadlock,
it was actually the first inter-religious dialogue organized by the
government. After the 1971 elections when the New Order regime
became more established, the government paid more serious attention
to the dialogue program.
A. Mukti Ali, the Minister of Religious Affairs, was the man
who started the inter-religious dialogue project in 1972. Inter-religious
dialogue, he said, could be an effective means to increase participation
of religious groups in government development programs and to
prevent them from inter-religious conflicts. Mukti Ali’s project,
therefore, was strongly related to what he frequently referred to as
“the harmony of  religious life” (kerukunan hidup beragama), that is,
peaceful co-existence of  religious groups. He suggests that dialogue
should be based on the agreement to disagree.
–––––––––––––––––
18 For a detailed discussion, see Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, Chapter 6.
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Mukti Ali then appointed Djohan Effendi to be the head of the
project. According to the latter, from 1972 to 1977, there were 23
dialogues of  religious leaders held in 21 cities all over the country. The
participants included government officials, leaders of the recognized
religions and even of  Javanese mysticism and local beliefs. Although
the dialogue was still far from Mukti Ali’s ideal of  agreement to
disagree, it was quite different from the debate in the Inter-religious
Consultation of 1967.
The government project on inter-religious harmony has continued
to develop since Mukti Ali’s period up to now. The project has been
mostly carried out by the Office of Research and Development of the
Department of  Religious Affairs. Sometimes, certain lecturers of  State
Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) are also involved in the project.
The project consists of various activities such as dialogue, research
training, workshops, publications, preparing a draft of a bill on religious
issues, etc.
Some religious leaders, however, felt unhappy with the
government initiatives. They saw that the dialogue organized by the
government was much more like a formal meeting among religious
leaders rather than having a true dialogue. For the critics, the aim of
the dialogue should not be only the ‘inter-religious harmony’ but ‘inter-
religious understanding and cooperation’. Moreover, some important
religious intellectuals argued that religious groups should not only
become supporters but also critics of the government development
projects. Influenced by liberation theology of  Latin America, in the
late 1970s, a few Catholic and Protestant intellectuals suggested that
the government development programs helped widen the gap between
the rich elites and the poor masses. Therefore, instead of  talking about
‘development’ or ‘modernization’, these critical intellectuals were
interested in developing a discourse on ‘social justice’. Some Muslim
intellectuals also tried to find an Islamic version of  theology of
liberation. In the early 1980s, some Indonesian Muslim intellectuals
found that the ideas of  the leftist Muslim thinkers like ‘Ali Syari’ati
from Iran and Hassan Hanafi from Egypt were parallel with the
Christian theology of  liberation.
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2. Privates Initiatives
Up to the late 1970s, most of the inter-religious dialogues in
Indonesia were organized by the government. It was only in early 1980s
that a serious non-government effort of developing inter-religious
dialogue apparently started in Indonesia. This effort came from the
Protestant intellectuals of the Indonesian Church Council (DGI) who
organized the inter-religious meeting called ‘Seminar of Religions’.
Started in 1981, this seminar provided the opportunity for religious
leaders to talk more openly and freely about social, political and cultural
issues from religious perspectives.
By the late 1980s, Soeharto shifted his political alliance from
secular Muslims and Christians to the Islamic groups, particularly the
Muslim reformists. This was particularly because Soeharto had conflict
with some influential army generals. In 1990s, Soeharto became closer
to the Islamic groups. He supported the establishment of  the
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) and several
members of  the ICMI became his cabinet ministers. The religious
minorities were understandably worried about this political
development. It was in this context that in 1992, the prominent
Protestant intellectual, Th. Sumartana, with support from Muslim,
Hindu, Buddhist and other intellectuals, establish the Institute for
Interfaith Dialogue (Interfidei) in Indonesia, based in Yogyakarta. The
major discourse of the Institute was how religious traditions could
contribute to the development of democracy and religious pluralism
in general.
In 1995, another private institution specifically concerned with
dialogue was established in Jakarta called ‘Majelis Dialog Antar-Agama’
(MADIA). This institution was initially supported by Protestant,
Catholic and Muslim activists and then followed by others of different
religious backgrounds. In the beginning, MADIA often organized
discussions among its members on theological issues, but later it was
also engaged in socio-political issues. One interesting thing in MADIA’s
activity was that they usually closed their meetings with prayers, offered
alternately according to the respective religions of  the participants.
The MADIA activists became much more responsive to socio-political
issues by the late 1990s when incidents involving religious symbols
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happened in the country.
During the late 1990s, several riots occurred in different places
of  the country in which a lot of  churches were burned by the rioters.
Some studies indicate that the riots were not spontaneous local Muslim
actions but operated by outsiders, and rumour said that certain generals
might be involved in providing logistical support to the rioters. In any
case, these riots helped increase the concern of many intellectuals with
the importance of  dialogue. In Situbondo, where one of  the riots
occurred, 19 Muslim and Christian leaders, thanks to a dialogue
organized by them, could successfully prevent further violence in their
society. On the other hand, the government spent a lot of  money in
organising national and international inter-religious dialogue in order
to repair the bad image of the government abroad. There were at least
two international inter-religious conferences generously financed by
the Government in 1997, one was held in the luxurious Horison Hotel,
Jakarta, with the participation of  the Hartford Seminary and Temple
University; and another was held in Leiden, the Netherlands.
3. Dialogue in the Post-Soeharto Period
After the fall of Soeharto regime, we bitterly witnessed the
bloody conflicts coloured by Islamic and Christian sentiments in Ambon
and Poso. Both the government and private institutions were busy with
organizing dialogues for people in the area of  conflicts. It was in this
period—perhaps because of the flood of foreign money—that a
number of NGOs for dialogue were established. It was also in this
period that Interfidei developed its network outside Java through the
so-called ‘Forum Dialog’ (Forlog). Perhaps, some of  the dialogues
contributed to establishing peace in the regions but it seems that
dialogue in the sense of ‘talking about religion and peace’ was not
enough. Some studies of  the conflicts suggested that the socio-political
and economic context in the region in question was the most important
issue to take into account.
–––––––––––––––––
19 For the Situbondo case, see Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and
Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 190-3.
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The fall of the New Order regime in 1998 marked the rise of
democracy in Indonesian politics. In this political context, dialogue
seems to find its momentum, because one might say that dialogue is
the most important part of  democracy. In a multi-ethnic and multi
religious society like Indonesia, dialogue is no doubt a necessity. On
the other hand, within the present free public sphere, many of the
ideologically oriented Muslim groups previously suppressed by the New
Order regime now re-emerge. There are also a few militant and radical
Muslim groups who are not tolerant to non-Muslims and even to
Muslims of  another group. The emergence of  these groups is a serious
challenge to the proponents of dialogue.
Faced with these challenges, the proponents of dialogue continue
their efforts to develop mutual understanding and cooperation among
activists of different religious background. An example of the efforts
is the program organized by the traditionalist Muslim NGO, the Wahid
Institute, called ‘Islam and Pluralism’. The program is attended by
Christian Ministers and teachers of the Indonesian Christian Church
(GKI). It is noteworthy that most of the GKI members and ministers
are Chinese. The program invites Muslim leaders and intellectuals to
present a paper on some important religio-political issues. By the end
of the program, the participants are given the opportunity to stay and
observe the life in an Islamic boarding school.
From the government side, in 2003, the Office of Research and
Development of the Department of Religious Affairs organized a series
of  discussions on a draft of  a bill concerning inter-religious harmony.
Leaders of the recognized religions were invited to talk. The draft of
the bill, however, eventually triggered strong opposition from Christians
and progressive Muslims, partly because it simply reintroduces the
decrees issued during the New Order period.20 Perhaps, because of
the opposition, the bill is not submitted to the Parliament (yet).
Probably the latest important government policy on inter-
religious harmony is to establish “Inter-religious Harmony Forum”
(FKUB) at the district and provincial levels. This is dictated by the
–––––––––––––––––
20 See the articles in Basis No. 1-2 (January-February, 2004), and in Syir’ah No.26
(January 2004).
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Joint Decree of the Minister of Home Affairs and Religious Affairs
No. No. 8 and 9/2006.  According to the Decree, the FKUB members
is appointed by people (read: representatives of recognized religions)
and facilitated by the government. The main duty of the FKUB is to
cooperate with the government in developing inter-religious harmony
and mutual understanding in society. It also has the authority to give
recommendation to the government regarding religious issues,
including the permission to build a new place of  worship (as mentioned
above). In several places, the FKUB has been established, and we will
wait and see whether it can function effectively in society.
E. Conclusion
The state policies on religious diversity in Indonesia are strongly
related to the nature of the state which is defined as neither secular
nor Islamic. This unclear position has provided a grey area in which
conflicts and compromises have been made. This is why the state
policies are usually found somewhere between total religious freedom
and state intervention. The total (and perhaps the true) religious
freedom, at least in theory, can be more easily achieved if  the state is
secular. On the other hand, a religious, or more precisely a theocratic
state, tends to break religious freedom of the people.
For the sake of  religious freedom, should Indonesia become a
secular state? For some people, a positive answer to this question is
the only solution to the problems of religious freedom in Indonesia. In
my view, however, politically speaking, to make Indonesia a secular
state is unrealistic. The long history of Indonesia shows us that the
neither secular nor Islamic compromise is still significance in
maintaining the unity and integrity of  the country. This does not mean,
however, that we are in a deadlock. The political democracy developing
in this Reformation Era has provided the opportunities for us to discuss
the problems openly, and hopefully we would eventually find the
solutions. Inter-religious problems cannot certainly be solved by state
centered policies without support and control from religious groups
themselves. In this case, we don’t have to start from zero because
since the New Order, there have been non-government initiatives to
build mutual understanding and cooperation among religious groups.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008 M/1429 H 121
State Policies on Religious Diversity in Indonesia
As indicated above, apart from its weaknesses, the Joint Decree
of 2006 has some positive points compared to the previous one. I
believe that other crucial issues can also be solved as long as we are
ready to open ourselves for dialogue. In this context, with regard to
the issue of the recognized religions, can the state give both protection
and aid to the recognized religions, and at the same time only provide
protection for those beliefs outside the recognized religions? As hinted
earlier, the Presidential Decree of 1965 apparently indicates that this
was the (right) policy, but in practice we know that beliefs outside the
recognized religions are often not protected by the state. Likewise, if
inter-religious marriage is difficult to accept religiously, can the state
legalize this marriage only based on civil rights? Because Indonesia is
neither Islamic nor secular, it seems to me that this solution is possible.
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